During the 1950s, failure of aircrafts due to material fatigue was becoming a nigbtmare. In 1954, two De HavilJand Cornets crashed. Investigation of the wreckage of the first Cornet established metaJ fatigue as tbe eau e. Aluminium, the metaJ commonly used for the skin of aircrafts, is fairly suseeptible to fatigue. Fatigue cracks can cau e weaknesses in the aircraft structure, which can result in aecidents. Aircraft need to be inspected frequently for fatigue cracks, corrosion and impact damage. These inspections and repairs, if needed, are very costly because the aircraft cannot be operated at that time. The failure of aircraft , due to metal fatigue, encouraged aircraft manufacturer to improve their struclures. Slrengthening the structure by adding more aluminium leads 10 heavier aircraft, however, which result in higher fuel co tso
BOX 8.1 GLARE®
Glare is an aircraft material built up from thin layers of aluminium bonded together with adhesive containing embedded glass fibres (prepreg) . lts major application is in the fuselage of Airbus superjumbo A380. The material has several advantages, compared to the 2024-T3 aluminium alloy (Vermeeren, 2003; Vogelesang, 2003) . First, the material has remarkably reduced and slower crack growth, about 10 to 100 times slower than in aluminium alloys. As a consequence, inspection of the structure for fatigue is not really necessary during the operational life of the aircraft. Second, the residual strength of Glare after multiple site damage is significantly higher. Third, the impact resistance is higher because of the high strain rate strengthening phenomenon in the glass fibres and the relatively high failure strain of the fibres. Fourth, the weight of the material is approximately 10 per cent lower than aluminium. Fifth, the flame resistance is extremely good. All in all, this means that aircraft can be designed with less material, and less need tor inspection. thus saving casts.
The relatively high production cost ot the laminates is the main disadvantage. These high costs are primarily caused by the complex and labour-intensive production process.
Aluminium Prepreg
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than 30 years of development and testing, Glare was eventual1y applied to the Airbus A380 mega-liner, as thefirst large-scale application of a fibremetallaminate to an aircraft fuselage (the body of the aircraft).
The Glare network can be characterized as a network with continuOlIS collaboration centred on a single innovatiol1. The level of involvement of the individual partners constamly changed over time, as did tht' composition of the network. But Fokker, TU Delft and NLR always stayed together. The goal of this collaboration was to develop fibre-metal laminates, first Arall and later Glare, and to get these applied to aircraft. This innovation is explorative in its nature, as it is a new aircraft material and involves new concepts of manufacturing, designing and applying these mat..:riab.
In the network, TU Delft had a central role a the initiator of the research and the knowledge centre. Later on, the role of the knowledge centre was taken over by a joint venture of Akzo and Alcoa, named Structural Laminates Company (SLC) succeeded by the Fibre Metal Laminates Centre of Competence (FMLC). Airbus and Stork Fokker AESP had a more centra1 role in managing the network when the application of Glare to the Airbus 380 materialized. Despite the presence of three core network partners (TU Delft, Fokker, NLR), there was no central authority that could exert power over all the other network members.
We find that in a decentralized network Iike this the motivation problem is the main challenge. The knowledge that has to be shared in this network is mo tly tacit, and is often core knowledge for the network partners. A triking conclusion i that the free-riding problem is not found, probably because the continuity of the collaboration bounded opportunistic behaviour by network members. Seven olutions are found that enable knowledge-sharing in th is network. These are, in order of importance: interper onal relation hips, agreements on value distribution, direct communication, network density, ab orptive capacity. printed and electronic media and goal alignment. Interper onal relation hip were very important [0 motivate partner. These relationships cr ated a network idelltit , thu improving ommitment and moti ation. and probably pre enting an free-riding. Second, agr em nts were important to create commitment 10 engage in development. Finally, direct communication was important in establishing interpersonal relationship and as an opportunity to share knowledge. The solution concepts are, however, not without risks. Relationships are vulnerable because relationships can be harmed by per onal tensions, and per onnel change could sever interpersonal ties between organizations. Formal rules and agreements can exclude certain parties from kl1owledge-sharing. thus possibly cutting olf innovation opportunities.
In the remainder of this chapter we will first describe the historical development of the Glare network. Subsequently, we analyse knowledge-sharin!!, in this network. We present an overview of the knowledge-sharing prob-!ems and discuss the solution concepts that were applied. Finally, we conclude this analysis by discussing interesting findings.
THE HISTORY OF THE GLARE NETWORK
Period I: Early History (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) The philosophy of Glare and its predecessor Arall rests upon two technique : bonding and laminating. The first idea sterns from tbe Dutch and British aircraft manufacturers Fokker and De Havilland. These companies used to build aircrafts by bonding the wooden parts. This idea was subsequently applied to metal, and Fokker applied their first bonded metal wing structure in the Fokker F-27 in 1955. The second technique laminating materiais, also sterns from the manufacture of wooden aircrafts. Fokker introduced the first laminated wing structure in 1916. Laminating multiple layers of plywood provided an opportunity to use different fibre orientations, arranging them in such a way that the directional strength of the material was optimized. This techniqu~is also applied in GJare, where the fibres run in different directions.
[n tbe fiTst two decades after the Second World War, Fokker started Jooking for ways to improve the fatigue properties of metal structures. This kind of research was carried out in cooperation with NLR and also with TU Delft. The indlistTial needs of Fokker drove the research. Special re eaTch projects were funded by the NIVR and qualified testing was done by LR. Fokker, TU Delft and NLR formed a close triangle in development, research and education (Figure 8.1 ).
This re earch at Fokker re ulted in the bonded metal trllcture of th F-27. Fatigue te t indjcated that the fatigue properties wer good. In 1971. Fokker and T Delft tarted tudying reinforcement of bonded aluminium tructures witb fibr ,an idea they had een at ASA during a visil to th S. Figure 8 . / Early history of [he network (1971-/981) officially abandoned by Fokker's R&D management. Some people at Fokker, like Paul Bijlmer, stilJ believed in tbe possibilities. He tried to continue the research contrary to the management' deci ion. but was forced to stop. At the individual level, however, same Fokker empluyees continued their cooperation with the people at TU Delft.
Researchers at TU Delft were convinced that fibre-metallaminates could have better fatigue properties than aluminium aJloys. These researchers included the group around Professor Schijve (who was the farmer head of the Structures and Materials Department at NLR) and Vogelesang (who later became Schijve's successor as a professor in Delft). This group initiated a research programme on laminated sheet material , which resulted in. a new kind of material, called Fibre-Metal Laminates (FMLs).
One of the first projects was carried out by a graduate student, Roei Marissen, who finished his thesis in 1980. Using the framework he developed in his thesis the research group was able to optimize the aluminium sheet thickness, the types of fibre and the fibre volume fraction. This resulted in thinner aluminium sheets, and for the fibre, aramid was chosen. Tests on this improved laminate sbowed that the material had excellent fatigue performance. The key to this is the 'crack bridging' mechani m of the fibre . Fibres remain intact under fatigue loading, whereas the aluminium cracks. The research at TU Delft thus resulted in a new material, whieh they called 'Arall' (Aramid Reinforced Alumjnium Lamioates) (de Vrie ,2001: 2; Vlot, 2001: 43) .
Period [I: etwork around Arall (1981-1991)
In pired b the promising re ults for Arall, TU Delft continued it research on fibre-metal laminates and looked for indu try collaboration and fundin . B cau e the managem ot of Fokker wa not interested in fibremetallaminates at that time and because specific material knowledge was needed, TU Delft looked for other industrial partners. lndustry involvement was especially needed for the supply and knowledge of strong fibre and thin aluminium sheets. Vogelesang got the Dulch chemicaI company Akzo interested in providing aramid fibres. The first step Akzo taak was to acquire the rights of the Arall patents that were filed in January 1981 by TU Delft with Vogelesang and Marissen as inventors. Akzo, in return, supported the research in Delft with a grant of 100000 guilders a year, by providing equipment and materiais, and by giving access to their lab.
By the end of )981, a second industrial partner had become involved. Through existing contacts at TU Delft, the American aluminium producer Alcoa became interested in the new material. Alcoa was willing to supply the thin aluminium sheets needed for Arall, although manufacturing these lhin sheets was difficult and required a lot of work. But Alcoa was concerned tlhat composites would replace aluminium in the future and with Arall they could both supply their aluminium and play a role in the market for composite material . Alcoa received a five-year exclusive Iicence to produce Arall, and laulJched the first commercial version of Arall in 1983. The third company to become involved was 3M, which supplied the 'prepreg' for bonding the aluminium sheets and the fibres. Unlike Alcoa and Akzo, 3M was not a development partner, but just a supplier of the adhesive.
Despite the Jack of interest in FMLs, Fokker was still an obvious industrial partner in the development because of the long relationship between TU Delft, Fokker and NLR. Therefore, the different parties tried to get Fokker involved. First, NIVR asked Fokker to play a more active role in Arall applications. [n 1984, this request resulted in an Arall working group with representatives from TU Delft, Fokker, NLR and NrVR. A wing panel for the existing Fokker F-27 could be developed and tested. First studies on the application of Arall on an 1'-27 wing had already been carried out by two students of Jan Willem Gunnink at TU Delft. This marked the fiTSt involvement of Gunnink in the development of FML . It wa remarkable certainly at that time, that Delft had designed the -ng panels and had even made the production drawings according to Fokker specifications, so tbat Fokker could easily produce the panels. Delft also designed all kinds of detailed test specimens and te ted them. So Fok er could test the larger ize panels including the full-scale panel. The de elopmen! of this wing wa funded by NIVR the fir t time TU Delft received direct funding from NIVR. This sparked a new era in which the role of T o lft moved from basic research towards development and testing, directly fund d by the government.
Tests on the full-cale F-27 panel again showed the x ellent proper ie of rail for fatigue and damage tIran e. A a re uIt, T 0 Irt tried to convince Fokker to use Arall in one of their aircrarts. In 1984, however, Fokker decided not to use Arall in its new F-SO. According to Daan Krook (former member of the board of directars of Fokker), Fokker would develop the F-Sü with a 'minimum change configuration' from the existing F-27. Therefore, a major change Iike applying Arall instead of aluminium was out of the question. The good results of the F-27 wing project nevertheless prompted Fokker to ask N LR to get more involved in the project, which the people at TU Delft feIt was an attempt to by-pass their involvement (Vlot, 2001: 71) . TU Delft was upset by this behaviour of Fokker and told Fokker that it would continue with Akzo, Alcoa and 3M as primary partners. So the relationship between TU Delft and Fokker became strainl:d. lndividual relationships between people at Fokker and TU Delft were stronger than the official dispute, and people on bath sides continued to be inv0hed in the project and remained on speaking terms and cooperative because they personally believed in the material and in the need ror cooperation. But Arall was never appJied to a commercial F-27, mainly because it was too expensive to qualify as the new material [or an existing aircraft.
RoeI Marissen, one of the inventors of Arall, moved to the German aerospace research institute DFVLR (later called DLR). This created links between DFVLR and Alcoa, NLR and TU Delft. However, DFVLR never had a real role in the development of Arall because Marissen was working in other directions than the people at TU Delft. The industrial partners in the Arall network limited knowledge-sharing between people at TU Delft and Marissen at DFVLR because they were concerned about leaking core knowledge in the direction of their German competitors.
The skies looked bright for Arall, but soon same cJouds would show up. ln 1987, Alcoa opened an Arall plant in Pittsburg (PA). Knowledge about the material properties of Arall originated from TU Delft and was integrated with the production knowledge of Alcoa. Shortly after the opening of the Arall production facility, an Arall conference was held in Seven Springs (PA). At this conference, the 'jur} of the international aviation community' was present and the TU Delft community presented excellent results for Arall at the conference. Off-tage, however, Geert Roebroeks, a Ph.D. student from TU Delft, had di covered same disappointing Arall propertie and the group at T Delft had already started working on a olution with glass fibres as an alternative to aramid. Marissen who was still working on Arall in Germany, had also found that aramid fibres around a crack would break under the cyclic loading condition that occur in fu elages. Mari sen wa up et about the fact that hi role in the de elopment of rail wa not acknowledged by the people from T Delft. He therefore decided to mention the detrimental properties in hi presentation in order to thwart, as he saw it, the development of Arall. The publication of some disappointing results and the attempts of the people at TU Delft to develop an alternative material harmed the image of Arall to some extent. The aviation community, however, became convineed that the principle of th~material was promising. which created space for the acceptance of an improved material (Vlot, 2001: 78) .
Tht' n~w variant of the material, with glass fibres, did not have the detrimental properties of Arall, and TU Delft coneentrated on further develupment of this material, which they calied Glare (GLass Aluminium REinforeed). A patent on this new material was filed by Akzo in October 1987 and was finally aecepted in 1991. At the same time, Alcoa had introduced it~first commercial AraJl produets and had managed to get a first application of Arall in the cargo door of the McDonnell Douglas C-17 (1981-199/) military transport aircraft in 1988. The complete network at thi period is shown in Figure 8 .2.
Period UJ: etwork around Glare (1991 Glare ( -2001 While Alcoa had its fir"t commercial Arall application. the relation hip between Alcoa and Akzo deteriorated. The exclusive production rights that Akzo had licensed to Alcoa were expiring. Akzo was losing interest, but thanks to Daan Krook's lobbying with the Akzo management, they continued to be involved, and started a Glare business. Akzo wanted to set up a joint venture with Alcoa for both Glare and Arall because this would possibly give Akzo opportunities to sel! tibres to the aerospace market. But Alcoa was not willing 10 have this joint venture, and the relationship became strained. Furthermore, a Dutch lobby at the international aerospace community for Glare, consisting of people from Akzo and TU Delft harmed the commercial position of AraI!. Alcoa finally decided ta go along with Akzo and Glare. This resulted in a joint venture, Structural Laminates Company (SLC), in 1991, which owned the patents. Akzo owned one-third and Alcoa two-thirds of this joint venture. The partnership company SLC, located in the US, was responsible for the comrnercialization of Glare and Arai!. On the DUICh side, the subsidiary of SLC, StructuraJ Laminates BV (SLBV), was located in Delft and was supposed to do research and technica] marketing. Although there was a promising new material, there was tiJl a Jong way to go. The goal was to get FMLs on a new aircraft type. The first challenge was to test and quaJify the material. Another challenge was to achieve the acceptance of the aviation industry. A major disadvantage for the aviation industry was the high costs of Glare, which were at that time up to 10 time higher than aluminium. Production was labour intensive and difficult. A major breakthrough ca me in 1993 when the concept of splicing was developed. With splices Glare panels can be wider than the size of the metal sheets they are made of. These wider panels significantly reduce the installation costs of Glare.
Various aircraft construction companies developed an interest in the material. First,in 1988, peop1c at MBB (which later became a part of Airbus Germany) read an article about Arall by Vogelesang and eonsidered it to be a promising materia!. These peopJe were responsible for testing a egment (called a 'barrel') of the Airbus A330 and A340. They were ab1e to test new materials too, and they asked TU Delft to produce a Glare test panel for the barrel. With funding from Akzo, TU Delft could get Fokker to produce the panels. The tests were performed in 1990 and the results were good. The people at Airbus Germany (the current name) eontinul:d testing Glare for different applications during the 1990 .
A econd company with an interest in GJare was Boeing. In 1990, Glare wa elected for a cargo floor in the Boeing 777 becau e of its excellent impact propertie . In J993, Rob van Oost from SLC wa ent to Boeing to tud th application of Glare on the suecessor of tbe 747 Jumbo Jet. Be au e the requirements of thi new plane frequently ehanged, he finally tudi d appli ati n in th already i ting Boeing 777. Although the ruit Iooked promising. Boeing decided not to u e GJare for the primary structure of the 777.
While industry interest grew, Alcoa was frustrating the people from SLC who tried to sell Glare to the a ireraft industry. During the 1990s, the poliey of Alcoa regarding Glare had changed. First, Arall was not a commercial success, and therefore their Arall plant was operating at aloss. Second. Glare was more and more seen as a eompetitor for their aluminium. because it was targeted at the same fuselage marker. Strategically, they wanted to prevent the application of Glare and therefore they obstructed the commercialization of Glare through SLC, sometimes by preventing SLC people from talking to deeision-makers at aircraft construction companies, at other times by giving inadequate or inaccurate informatioTI. The reason why Boeing deeided not to use Glare, in spite of good test results was in part a result of Alcoa's behaviour. Bill Evancho (at that time, head of SLC) believed that the salespeople from Alcoa convineed Boeing not to use Glare. Jn 1993, this finally resulted in a moratorium on Glare studi s, set by thc management of Bo~ing.
While this closed the door to Boeing, interest from other sides grew. The third organization that became interested was the US Air Force. A US Air Force officer had heard about Arall and started his Ph.D. study on Glare at TU Delft in the early 1990s. On his return, he convineed the US Air Force to lIse Glare for fuselage repairs of the C-5A Galaxy transporter (Vlot, 200 I: 130, 131; Scholtens, 1995) . Besides this program me, the lTS Air Force also evaluated Arall for a rudder, for flaps and for dorsal covers.
A fourth company with an interest was Bombardier Aerospace. Jn 1996, they decided to use Glare for a part of the Learjet 45 business jet. The fifth company was Garuda Airlines (Indonesia) who used Glare for a panel of an Airbus A330 (Vlot, 2001: 138) . And subsequently, in April 1999, an experimenta1 Glare fuselage panel was installed on a German Luftwaffe A31 O. Furthermore, US Airways used Glare in a cargo bay floor, and Galaxy Scientific Corporation used Glare in an explosion-hardened container.
Also Aérospatiale (later Airbus France) became involved. [n 1994, Buwe van Wimersma was sent to TouJou e by SLC. He studied the application of GJare to the A330. Later, in J997 and 1998, he and his colleague Gise Wit became members of the Large Aircraft Division led by Jens Hinrichsen. They prepared information about Glare to convince him to apply it. Thi e entually resulted in the choice of Glare for the fuselage of the A3XX hich later became the A380. The group at TU Delft needed extra [unding for the iocr a ing numb I' of te tand exp ri ment . The Dutch go emment saw the need for a tI' ng push to Airbu , belped by the lobbying efforts of Krook, Gunnink and og Ie ang. Tb funded half the osts of tbe A31 0 panel and als allcated in total about 30 million euros to the Glare project in the period 1997 to 2003, which was coordinated by the NJVR. Thi funding was used to start the Glare Technology Program (GTP, later Glare Research Programme, GRP), in which TU Delft, SLC (later SU and FMLC), NLR, Airbus and Stork Fokker AESP were invoJved. Later, a significant part of the money was also used to get Glare tested in the mega-liner barrel test, a huge fuselage section similar to the A380. This test began in 2001 and the panels are still heing studied today. These tests were perfornled at Airbus Germany, but NLR engineers wen: involved in these tests as weil. Through this involvement, they learned aboutAirbus's t~st methods and results.
Alcoa considered Airbus's growing intl:rest in Glare as a threat to their core business, the production of aluminium. They convineed Akzo to shur down the production facility of SLC, formally because of low customer Alcoa eventually withdrew and the joint venture SLC was broken up. At first, Akzo continued its GJare aclivities. With the help of Daan Krook (who was a board member of SLC), Akzo acquired licences for GJart' in Europe. Akzo restructured SLBV to Structural Laminates Industries (SU).
But shortly after that, Akzo reconsidered the fit of SU with the core business of Akw. They decided to selJ SU hecause they cou1d not produce the material they did not supply the specific glass fibre that was used in Glare and their core activities were not in the aerospace sector. As aresuIt, in 1998, Akw sold SU to Stork Aerospace.
At Stork Aerospace, SU became incorporated in Fokker AESP. Fokker AESP consisted of what was left of Fok\...er, which had gone bankrupt in 1996. So, after years of low commitment on the part ()f Fokker, the 'new' Fokker became heavily invo1ved again. With the incorporation of SLI in Fokker AESP, Fokker finally got a licence for the production of Glare.
Period IV: Airbus and Future G1are (2001-) As Alcoa and Akw withdrew from the network, interest from Airbus (which resulted from a merger in 2001 between aerospace companie in Germany, Sp:lin, England and France) grew. Tbey became convinced of the excellent propertjes of Glare after an exciting lubbying period. In particular, the opportunity for weight reduction persuaded them. In 200 I, the Heads of Agreement for application of G1are in the A380 was signed with Stork Fokker AESP who would be producing the material. But the industrialization of Glare was still at an early stage. Stork Fokker AESP quickly started building a manufacturing plant, indu trializing Glare and qualifyiog the production proces according to aerospace norms. The plant \ as built in Papendrecht, The Netherlands, and was officially opened in ovember 2003, although production had already begun in 2002. Airbu al 0 wanted to acquire the knowledge and capability of manufactUl-ing Glare and opened a. plant in ordenbam. Germany, to manufactur fi of the 27 Glare panel. The knowledge about Glare propertie r quired f, r these production facilities wa mainly obtained from peopJe from the farm r SL , nO\ \ orking at FML and Stork Fokker AESP.
To get the material ready for tbe manufacture of the first A380 the par ties worked closely together. The design of Glare parts and development of the design principles occurred in close cooperation between Stork Fokker AESP and Airbus. These companies also jointly developed production and improved the material further. This resulted in a new generation of Glare, with improved strength. calied HSS Glare. For the qualification of the material NLR Stork Fokker AESP, FMLC, TU Delft and Airbus worked closely together to demonstrate the quality of the material and to perfarm all tests. TU Delft, with its very enthusiastic group of students and employees, performed tests that showed which fields needed more testing or even fUl-ther improvement and which fielJs had been tested satisfactorily. The qualification testing was subsequently done by NLR, according to the norms in aerospace. Another lask was to distribute the funding frorn the NIVR and the govemment. But because Airbus became fully involved in the development of Glare, lhe nece sity for extemal funding decrea ed. In 2003, also due to policy changes by th Dutch government funding was reduced to a minimum. The managing director of FMLC was Jan Willem Gunnink. But b the end of 2004, following a di pute 0 er policy, Gunnink left FMLC and ·tarted a new company named GTM. Almo 1all the employe from FMLC joined this new company. GTM is currently, among other projects, developing new materials and structures, which includeimprovements to aluminium tructures. One of their c1ients is Alcoa, which again has expressed interest in the development of FMLs and is also cooperating wilh Airbus on developments around Glare and laminated aircraft materiais.
Besides GTM, another small new company appeared, GlobalTechnics (see Figure 8 .4 for the network as of 2001). Gise Wit, Adel Khoudja and a third partner [ounded this enterprise. They provide knowledge and experience of Glare to the network and perform calculations on Glare. Their main c1ients are Stork Fokker AESP, Airbus, and Airbus partners. Table 8 .1 lists the main events in the development of Glare. Thirty years may seem like a long time for sueh an innovation to come to fruition. One reason for the long development palh is the fact that extensive makrial quaJifications are necessary before a new material can be applied to any aircraft structure. A second reason is that aerospace manufacturers will generally only make an investment in a new material when they design a completely new type of aircraft. This has severely Iimited the Bumber of windows of opportunity fOT" GJare. With only a limited number of sufficiently large aerospace manufacturers in the world, the developers of Glare had to make sure that the right people at sucb companies were convinced of the superior properties of Glare just as plans for a new aircraft type were being developed.
KNOWLEDGE-SHARING PROBLEMS IN THE GLARE NETWORK
The development of fibre-metal laminates eventually Jeading to lhe production and application of Glare, started as a loose cooperation between Fokker, NLR and TU Delft. Over time, tbe network expanded and the level of involvement of partners changed. Problems and tensions between partners came and went. Over lhe years tbe partners in the network bad to create, sbare, and integrate knowledge related to material propertjes, materials testing, aerospace requirement , de ign knowledge and production knowiedge. Some of this knowledge could be codified and shared 'on paper'· other knowledge wa of tbe tacit kind. All this knowledge-sbaring took place without a core network player orcbestrating tbe process or a grand design for knowledge-sharing. Yet in spite of variou knowledgesharing problems btween network partner and the lack of explicit knowledge management to solv these problem , the goal was eventually achieved: the fiT. t Airbu A380 uper-jumbo took to tbe air in April, 2005 witb 350 m 2 ection of Glare panels in Îl [u lag. What is the tory bebind thi success?
To unravel this story. we wil! first discus the four general knowledgesharing problems and subsequently pay attention to the solutions, as they appeared in tbis case study. In the Glare network, tbe main knowledgesharing problems were those related to efficiency and motivation. The e problems were tackled through interpersonal relationships. agreements on value distribution and sanctions. These solution concepts are the most salient and provide all explanation of the successful knowledge-sharing in spite of the lack of a grand design of knowJedge management.
lVlotivation
The motivation of partners to share knowledge is very important. In the Glare case, motivation was not a probJem generally. Various individuals acted as passionate inspirers, motivating othas to stay involved and share knowledge. Professional pride and apassion for fibre-metal lamin' les facilitated knowledge-sharing in the network. But, at times, competition, conflict, and personal pride would negatively inftuence motivation. The relationship betweC'n TU Delft and Fokker was not always without problems, for instance. They repeatedly argued ab0ut who invented Arall. Fokker would give presentations abollt Arall without naming TU Delftt. as the inventor. There would also be competitive strife about who should receive funding from NJVR; the industrial partner Fokker, or the academic partner TU Delft. This caused recurring conflicts between Fokker and TU Delft, although these were sometimes more moral than formal confticts (Vlot, 200 I: 72, 73) . Such confticts decreased the motivation of the partners to cooperate with each other. Aftel' the bankruptcy of Fokker in 1996, the problem largely disappeared because the people involved in the initial conflict were no longer working at TU Delft or Fokker.
Issues caused by personal pride and personal 'battles for competence' were the second driver behind the motivation problem. This problem fi rst appeared in the relationship between NLR employees and people from TU Delft. The very enthusiastic Vogele ang came to NLR with his new mat rial and NLR performed tests on the material. But the people at NLR w re ceptical and have more or les remained so ever since. This cau ed difficultie in the relationship. The tensions between Mari sen and the people [rom T Delft were also about per onal pride. And in the la t pha e of the development, knowledge-haring bet ween Fokker AESP and Airbus ordenham wa Ie s optimal becau e people aw it a a battle for competence' lhu creating a ituation where it would be a weakn tak the other for help.
FinaU, th comp titi e trategies of firms in the n tw rk al 0 hind r d (he motivation CO share knowiedge. In the early years of Glare Alcoa obstructed contacts between SLC and Boeing because they starled to see Glare as a competitor to their aluminium. They were no longer motivated to turn Glare into a success. More recently, the motivation to hare knowledge between Airbus-Fokker and other interested parties has been hindered by Airbus's concerns over knowledge leaking to Boeing.
Boundaries
In the Glare network, people from different organizations and from different backgrounds had to work together and share knowiedge. Crossing the boundaries between different practices, cult.ures aDlI organi7ations was sometim~s Jitficult. In Ihis case study, the two most influential boundaries that had to be crossed were boundaries between culture (both natiooal and corporate) and between professional backgrounds.
The boundaries between cultures appeared for example in the relationship between TU Delft and NLR. This caused di cussions about the demarcation of tasks. According to Vogelesang, tbis can also be interpreted as atension between a professional research organization (NLR) and an educational institute without a qllalified testing lab (TU Delft). Boundaries between national cultures were pre ent between Alcoa and the Dutch partners, and between Airbus France and the Dutch partners togetber with Airbus Germany.
Knowledge-sharing was at times hampered because of boundaries between people with different backgrounds. Even when people bad the same profession, [or example researchers, it was hard to uoderstand each other s results, because of the differences belween the research areas and interest. For example, in the 1990s when Fokker AESP and Airbus were asked to provide guidance 00 the developments at TU Delft, they lacked the appropriate knowledge to do this.
Efficiency
As the de elopment of Arall and Glare progre ed, the tock of knowledge accumuJated, and more and more indi iduals became involved. Tbis exacerbated the challenge of creating and haring knowledge in an efficient way. The efficiency problem ha two main cause : lack of indu try leader hip in development, alld frequent change of personnel.
The fir t challenge wa related particularly to the efficiency of crealing knowIedge. The developmeots at T Delft did oot alway fit tbe oeed of industry. M re 'guidance' from indu tr \ a oeeded. But the industrial partn r la ked lhe appropriate in ight to e the wa ahead or did oot understand the priority of providing guidance. As aresult. ometimes re earch wa undertaken which was not very uscful for the further developmeot of FML . Gise Wit, who was involved in the cooperation of Airbus, TU Delft and Fokker, said: 'A lot of reports were very useful. but also a number ended up in the garbage cao'. After a while, some individuals at Airbus were appointed to guide the research, but they often lacked appropriate knowledge and time to provide dficient guidance. Therefore, SLBV, later on SU and in tbe last phase FMLC, took the lead in directing activities.
Second, the efficiency of knowledge-sharing was harmed by regular change of personnel in the network. At TU Delft, a lot of research in the lab was carried out by graduates. These former students usually worked very el1lhllSiastically in the lab for about two years and then moved to a job elsewh ere. When they did not end up working for one of the network partners, the knowledge they acquired often disappeared from the network. According to Gise Wit, at that time working for Fokker: 'The knowledge rests with a limited number of peopk. bècause the others Ieave the network quickly. Of course, it rests with th~' pGrmanent employees. Iike Ad Vlot and Geert Roebroeks. But Ad Vlot died, Boud Vogelesang left.... So, J think that the knowledge also seeped away to some extent.' On the other hand, graduates heading out ta atber companies within the network helped to diisperse knawiedge, thus improving efficiency.
Knowledge-sharing efficiency was not helped either by the frequent change in those attending GRP meetings. Some network partners did not acknowledge the important role of the GR P meetings for knowledge exchange and sent whoever was available 10 these meetings, thus forgoing the opportunity to build long-term relationships between team members.
The efficiency problem was never fully eliminated. Regular meetings and strong interpersonal relationships somewhat reduced this problem. Tn pairticular, the research programmes increased the efficiency of knowledgesharing, because these established some sort of central coordination. Nevertheless, 10 (out of 17) respondent named the efficiency problem (alo talking about the la t phases), because it was a centra! issue in knowledgesharing in the whole development trajectory.
Free-riding
[n the Glare network, no clear instance of the free-riding problem were found. Sometimes, lhe danger of free-riding raised its head, a in 1986 when Fokker tarted negotialion with NLR to g t them more invoJved in the development, wbile the c ntre of de elopm nt wa lill at T Delft. Fokker even que tioned whether there wa till a role for TU Delft. At T De/ft, they feit, however, thaI Fokker had 'hijacked' the Arall project without having pUI much effort into it before. Because Delft did not want to support this new direction, the attempl failed. Thus. the frec-rider problem was tackled in a natural way. All respondents.looking back at the whole development trajectory, said that no partner profited more than their fair share considering their contributions. Some partners profited more than others, but they also took more risks and spent more effort and money on the Glare development. Because all partners were willing to cooperate for a long time the fr~e-riding problem did not occu!'. Within this long time frame, partners did not show any significant opportunistic behaviour. Another explanation for the prevention anel reduction of the free-riding probIem is the strong network identity among. the core of the individuals involved. Such a network identity motivated them to share knowiedge, and created commitment (shared norms and beliels) and trust which prevented free-riding.
SOLUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE-SHAR ING IN THE GLARE NETWORK
In the absence of conscious knowledge management in the Glare network several solution concepts were applied more or less unconsciously that enabled and improved knowledge-sharing. An overview and illustration of the findings is presented in Table 8 .2. Each solution concept is discussed in the following text, in order to provide more insight into their effectiveness in the Glare case. This discussion concludes with a graphical representation of the relationships between solution concepts and problems.
The Effeetiveness of Interpersonal Relationships
The concept of interpersonal relationships is a solution that explains the success story of Glare to a large extent. Where organizations often considered their own aims and goals instead of the common good, the interpersonal contacts provided a trong informal network committed to the development of FMLs. This 'Glare community was also a basis for tru t. The informaJ network wa an important enabler for knowledge-sharing in the network of organizations. When organizations practically withdrew from the network, individual engineers continued to be involved carried on the development and shared their knowiedge. Althougb organization restricted knowledge-haring, theengineer ontinued to hare their knowIedge, because of hared belie~and pa sion for the material. The e interper onal ontacts \ ere cr aled at conference like th AraU conference, meetings within th.: aerospace field (Brite Euram programme, GRP, etc.), and last but not least through TU Delft graduate heading out into companies all over the world. Over time the inlerpersonal network grew because more people became involved and more graduates swarmed out.
The solution concept of interpersonal relationsbips is, however, fairly vulnerable. When relationships break up because of confliets or personnel change the channel tor knowledge-sharing between organizations disappears. For example, a wnflict that occurred in the 1980s damaged the relationship between people at Fokker and people from TU Delft for a long time, creating Chinese walls between these groups and influellcing knowledge-sharing. In the words of Adel Khoudja: 'In the past, there was a conflict between TU Delft and Fokk.:r. [ was part of Fokker. Much later, YOll could still not easily come back in the TU Delft group'. GRP teams who worked on as igned Glare-related developments. The Large Aircraft Divi ion at Airbus in Toulouse (co-Iocated) where SLC people and Fokker (A ESP) people were involved. Aral! conferences (Seven Springs, 1987 and TU Delft, 1988 ) and lare conferences with presentation for researchers aircraft manufacturers and a iation companies. Frequently held GRP meetings. NLR engineers who visited the barr I te t. People from TU Delft visiting Airbus's production facilities and design team. Milestone events for the people involved in GRP Design trainings held at irbus.
FMLC functioned as a formal knowledge institute, brokering knowledge of imohed partners. There were comacts at Airbus, who were responsible for bringing the right people in contact with each other. Thc spin-offs, GT\1 and GlobalTcchnics, can broker knowledge within and outside the (core) network.
Absorptive Capacity
Printed and electron ic media Common e-mail system ; data-links for the design of the Glare parts of the A380 between Fokker AESP and Airbus: 200 test reports with results for 'basic Glare'; a stre s manual for Glare written by people at GlobalTechnics and used within Airbu . dissertalÎons from TU Delft; graduation reports from TU Delft; journal articles from researchers at TU Delft.
hared goal: application of Glare on the A380 of the Dernarcalion responsibilities and \Vork field between NLR and TU Delft. Priority setting of Airbus and Fokker for T Delft.
Agreements on Value Oistribution: Protection and Creation of Commitment
Al10ther important solution concept that can shed some light on the dynamics of the development of Glare concerns the rules and agreements in the Glare network. Over time, several formal agreements were made. These mies and agreements had the positive effect that they created commitment to haring knowiedge, but on the other hand knowledge-sharing with excluded parties became more limited. For example, TU Delft made agreements about intellectual property and funding with Akzo, Aleoa and 3M. These agreements solidified the commitments of Akzo, Aleaa, and 3M to the development of FMLs. But these agreements also had an oppo ite effect: tbey restricted knowledge-sbaring with partners in the periphery of the core network, like Marissen working for DFVLR in Germany.
The positive effect of agreements is also illustrated by the agreed joint venture of Akzo and Aleoa: SLC. This agreement proved to be effective in support of knowledge-sharing when Aleoa wanted to get rid of Glare. Because Alcoa had an agreement with Akzo, ending the involvement would have had legal consequences. Therefore Aleoa was urged to find a better way out, which created the chance to keep Glare in The Netherland . Otherwise, Aleoa would probably have put the Glare patents and knowledge on a helf, thus restricting further development and knowledge-sharing.
Direct Communication
Meeting were an effective means of direct communi at ion belween repreentati es of network partner. Different kind of meeting existed: site visit training e ion, discu ion meetings, (co-located) team working, conferenc and ocial event . Each had their 0\ n effeetivene , frequenc and altendees. Site visits were effective and efficient because they enabled rich interaction (live), provided tbe complete context (e.g. production facilities, test set-up) and also enabled knowledge-sharing in a protected situation. For example, with the barrel test, visiting engineers from NLR had a chance to see the whole test and set-up. If they had not visited the test, this knowledge would not have been shared.
Meetings were a standard way of knowledge-sharing throughout tbe development trajectory. In the 1980s and at the beginning of the I990s, there was na formal network-wide consultative structure. From the inception of the research programmes (GTP, GRP), frequent meetings were held with the different parties and at different levels. These meetings were effective in reducing confliets through trust-building, in dealing with motivation issues by creating commitment, and in increasing knowledge-sbaring efficiency through providing a rich knowledge channel. Not all partie were as motivated to attend these meeting and contribute, which in some case led to frequently changing representatives in the meetings. This was not conducive to knowledge-sharing. A context-specific kind of meeting was the (academie) conference. Such conferences were effective at sharing knowiedge, creating interest in prospective partners, sharing beliefs, building new relationships and creating a network identity.
Network Density
Knowledge brokers were an effective solution, especially for creating network density and thus tackling the efficiency and boundaries problems. Two types can be distinguished: the formal, institutionalized knowledge broker' and the informal knowledge broker. The first type is represented by the research group at TU Delft, later SLC and FMLC. In tbe cooperation with Airbus, there were also formal knowledge brokers: contact that brought people from Fokker AESP and Airbus together.
The second type, the informal knowledge broker is represented by informal contacts (interpersonal relationship ) and 'spin-offs'. These 'spin-offs' were especially efficient at overcoming the knowledge protection issue. GTM, which consists of people who worked at FMLC anJ SLC, is now more able to share knowledge with different c1ients and less lied to proteclive measures of other partner.
Absorpthe Capacity
Through the exchange of people betwen network partner absorpti e capacity was created in the network. Boundarie are bridged and people bec me more moti ated be au e of . hared pas ions. It aloprovides a mean for context-rich personal interaction thus enabling efficient knowledgesharing. Two instances of personnel exchange are found, the 'nOrJnal' exchange of people between organizations for a certain time period, like van Wimersma and Wit, who were stationed at Airbus France for a period of time. A second. form of personnel transfer is the 'swarming out' of graduating students from the structures group at TU Delft. They acquired knowledge in the curriculum. often wrote a thesis on FMLs and sometimes stayed one or two years at the faculty to perform testing. When they subsequently moved tn an employer in the aerospace industry, they brought with them their knowiedge. contacts and enthusiasm. This created motivation and channds to find and share knowledge more efficiently.
Besides the efficient knowledge-sharing and the motivation effect, personnel exchange was also effective at crossing knowledge protection barriers
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(similar in effect to site visits) anJ dispersing knowleJge, thus establishing more common knowIedge, creating absorptive capacity.
Printed and Electronic Media
Codified knowledge can be transferred through reports and information systems. This creates knowledge-sharing opportunities, thus providing a solution to the efficiency problem. Reports consisted mainly of test reports, handbooks and publications. The effeetiveness of reports and pubJications depended on the context. Because publications contained more intonnation than the parties actually needed, the knowledge was sometimes not used very effeetively. Knowledge-sbaring via reports and publications was e pecially efficient when thc receiving party had a question that was answered in the report.
Witb tbe development of information technology, information systems were more often used to share information and codified knowiedge. In the last pbase, when Airbus was beavily involved, special data links were u ed for engineering and design, besides regular systems sueh as e-mail. But, in general, the use of special information sy tems was ver} lirnited.
Goal Alignment
This solution concept can be pht into three: deci ions about the demarcation of the work area, shared goal and focu of the industry. Fir t, demarcation wa us ful to ereate clear understandings of each other's task , thu reduciog po ible competition conflicts. At one time, there were tensions betwe n LR and TU D Ift about doing materials te tand building a te t lab at Delft. Tb dealt ith tbi i ue b making arrangement· about the demarcation of ta k.
Second, the common goal of the Glare project and especially of the research programmes was to gel the material apphed to an aircraft. This common goal was beneficiaI and attractive to all partners and thus provided the basis lor motivation. This common goal ensured that the different individual goals of tbe partners never dominated, which would probably have resulted in the end of the cooperation. However, the knowledgesharing was to some extent restricted by the different goals. Partners were not always willing to cooperate entirely, because they had different interest or priorities. This caused inefficiency, delayed the dèvelopment process and reduced the motivation of other partners. Third, at an industry level a more effkient allocativTI of research funding could have been achieved by a greater tocus. Focus only emerged when Airbus became fully involved. From then on research was carried out which was more closely adapted to the needs of a specific partner, Airhus.
Relationships between Solution Concepts and Problems
We will complement the overview of probJems and solution concepts with Figure 8 .5 which summarizes the insights and relationships discussed. This figure is built upon the interview data. We carefully analysed the frequency \.\ ith which solution concepts, problems and relationships between them were mentioned.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis provides a number of intere ting insights. First it is striking that free-riding appeared not to be a problem in the Glare network. Although it is a decentralized network, without a central orchestrator none of the partie di played free-riding behaviour. The long-term scope of the netw0rk may have prevented free-riding. At particular moments, a situati on of free-riding seem to appear, but tbis is quickly corrected by other partners. And considering the whole time span, more or less opportunistic behaviour by a partner at one point in time i balanced by a lot of collaboration at another time. Second, this study showed intere ting evidence of the importance of informal mechani ms in a decentralized network but also demonstrated the vulnerability of these informal means (e.g. to peronnel change and disagreements). Anotber important finding was the ffecti ene s of agreements on value distribution. On the one hand, thi olution concept con titutes tru tand commitment, thus enabling knowledge-sharing. On the other hand, agreement on value distribution can also limit knowledge-sharing and reduce absorptive apacity. Hence, some solution concepts may have drawbacks. Furthermore, the Glare case also made clear that more solutions are not always better. Same solutions are more applicable in some networks than in others.
Regarding knowledge types, the case analysis shows that it is harder to share core and tacit knowledge than non-eore and explicit knowkdge. For example, the knowledge regarding specific Glare properties was dililcult to share. Sharing core knowledge increased the motivation problem, because (industrial) partners wanted to proteet this knowIedge. But a1so at an individuallevel, peopJe were sometimes not willing to share their care knowledge because of personal pride. The protection problem was reduced by creating more commitment by formal agreements. Informally, interpersonal relationships, meetings, and site visits were very important to sharing Figure 8 .5 So!zttion concepts in relation to knowledge-sharing problems core knowiedge. The Jatter three solutions have the advantage that they aJso provide an opportunity for sharing tacit knowJedge. Sharing th is (highly) tacit knuwledge requires absorptive capacity. But in the Glare case, a common knowledge base was often absent and Glare's development was slowed down by protective measures. Considering network type the Glare network could be characterized as a decentralized, continuous international network focu ed on a single innovation. In a decentralized network few central solutions can be applied, and commitment to knowledge-sharing cannot be enforced. Thu informal and decentralized soJutions, like interpersonal relationships and direct communications, were extremely important for knowledge-sharing. Fortunately, because the cooperation panned a long time period, a bigger structure could emerge from local olutions. CentraJ teams like the GRP teams were founded, which was possible because there was funding, support and commitment. Also the function of the knowledge centre could become more formalized in the founding of FMLC by thrt:e network partners (NLR, TU Delft, Stork Fokker AESP). These new entities at the core ()f the network never fulfilled the role of network orchestrator, however, Clnd could not exert any power over the other network partner.
Explorative innovation i surrounded by uncertainty, as the GJare tory clearly shows. There wa uncertainty in the application of the material uncertainty regarding the invoJvement of network partners and often it was uncertain whether the material wouJd ever be succe ful. Tbe indefinite time frame and the unknown obstacle in the de elopment path were the r a on why industrial partners 10 t motivation when clear progres and application opportunitie were lacking. That Glare, however bec.am ucce ful i largelya re uit of the pre erance of a lirnited group of 'believr ' combined with the appearanc of an applicalion opportunity in hich th advantag f Glare w r r ognized. Was it necessary lhat thi proce look 30 year ? Perhap n I but thing always look simpier in hindsight. The development and application of Glare was bounded by many constraints that could not easily be changed, like funding possibilities, application possibilities and the time needed for the acceptance of a fundamentally new material in a community already divided by the battle between the aluminium engineers and the composite engineers. Moreover, in the aircraft industry, introductions of completely new large aircraft are few and far between. The Airbus A380 was the fir t aircraft. where Glare could be appJied on a large scale. There were a number of other possibilities, but for various reasons Glare was not adopted in those designs. Two of our respondents discussed this issue and said: 'We are talking about a situation where facts and relationships have to come together. If we did not hJve a good relationship with Airbus, Glare would have never been applied on Ihis plane.' 'But maybe on the Boeing: 787 inslead . .. 'Or neither. It depends on a good product and on having good relationships. If one of these is lacking. nothing happens. ' The continuity of the network bounded opportunistic bc::haviour by parties. There were always one or more network partners who saw the longterm benefits of continued cooperation and knowledge-sharing. Even when certain parties temporarily withdrew (Fokker) or permanl:n tly kft the network (Akzo), other parties saw room for continuity. The fact that the network was dispersed across national borders and~ontinents did not make knowledge-sharing easier, but good personal relationships and frequent meetings between a core group of individuals kept all major network partners involved and 'in the loop'.
It is precisely this passion for fibre-metal laminates shared by a select number of individuals that has eventually landed Glare on the Airbus A380. Knowledge-sharing and cooperation in the network have been a struggle at times, but by the conscious and, more often, subconscious application of various solution concepts the knuwledge-sharing problems of motivation free-riding efficiency and boundaries were overcome. Eventually, 30 years of pa ionate work on an essentially Dutch invention connected with a window of opportunity in the fiercely competitive battle between the two aerospace giants in the world.
SUMMARY
Thi case study de cribes the development of the new aircraft material Glare in an international network. After 30 year of development, thi new material wa finally applied on a large scale, on the irbu A3 O. Regarding knowledge-sharing, it become dear that moti ation may be an important challenge in a decentralized network where knowledge is shared with high tacitness and coreness. It is stI;king that the free-riding dilemma was not found, probably because the continuity of collaboration bounded opportunistic behaviour by network members. In the Glare case, knowledgesharing was managed by a num ber of means, most of which were applied more or less unconsciously. The three most important solutions were: (I) interpersonal relationships, which were very important in motivating partners; (2) rules and agreements, which were important in creating commitment tn engage in development; and (3) meetings, which were important in establishing int~rp(:rsonal relationships and whi-:h served as opportunities to share knowIedge. NOTE I. For th is case study, two data sources were used: interviews and documentation. The inter· views sought to uncover multiple understandings of the ame phenornena. Eighteen inter· views were conducted; interviewee were selected such that allthe main network player were repre ented. The e erni-structured interviews lasted 1.5 hours on ave rage. All inter· view' were recorded and fully tran cribed. Sub equently, the transcript ion was checked with the interviewee. 
